The utilization of resources in health care is predominantly controlled by physicians. Therefore, a thorough understanding of health care remuneration systems, especially of the influence of reimbursement contracting on physicians’ behavior, is essential for understanding the potential effects of policy interventions and for predicting the long run viability of a health care system. This volume investigates and compares alternative reimbursement schemes and their implications for health care reforms. It analyzes the contractual aspects of the relationship between physicians and patients and the distribution of risks between health insurers and physicians. One major focus is the investigation of the effects of a fixed budget system. Here, empirical evidence for the German market for physician services is given.

The Author: Born in Wasserburg am Inn, Germany, Franz Benstetter worked several years in a public bank, before he studied economics at the University of Munich and at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Then he was lecturer (Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter) at the Department of Economics, University of Munich, where he obtained a doctorate degree in economics in 2001. At present he is lecturing economics at the University of Technology, Munich. His fields of interest are industrial organization, health economics and corporate finance.